Abstract-This paper examines the effects of gunfights between drug gangs in Rio de Janeiro's favelas on student achievement. We explore variation in violence that occurs across time and space when gangs battle over territories. Within-school estimates indicate that students' scores are lower in math in years in which they are exposed to drug battles. The effect increases with conflict intensity, duration, and proximity to exam dates and decreases with the distance between the school and the conflict location. School supply is an important mechanism. Gunfights are associated with higher teacher absenteeism, principal turnover, and temporary school closings.
I. Introduction
D RUG-related violence perpetrated by criminal gangs is a widespread phenomenon in many developed and developing countries, particularly in urban areas. In recent years, violence involving drug trafficking organizations has notoriously reached unprecedented levels in Mexico and Central America (Rios, 2012; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011) . Conflicts between drug dealers using combat weapons caused Marseille, France, to experience one of the most extreme periods of violence in its history in 2012 ("In a City Plagued by Violence," Herrmann & Rockoff, 2012) . In the United States, retail drug trade and the distribution activities are routinely associated with violent, and often lethal, disputes over control of drug territory and enforcement of drug debts (FBI, 2011) . Although the negative consequences of drug-related violence may go far beyond the casualties of those directly involved in the criminal activity and its victims, little is known about whether this phenomenon has other detrimental impacts on the population in affected areas. In particular, violence can have serious welfare consequences in both the short and the long runs if it affects education production, children's schooling, and accumulation of human capital. This paper studies the negative spillovers of conflicts between drug gangs in Rio de Janeiro by analyzing how they affect educational outcomes of children attending schools located in and around conflict areas. In recent decades, several favelas (slums) scattered across the city have been dominated by drug gangs that use the territory to sell drugs and hide from police (Misse, 1999; Silva, Fernandes, & Braga, 2008) . 1 When gangs fight to gain territory, local violence skyrockets. These conflicts are extremely violent and rely on heavy weaponry, such as grenades and military-grade machine guns. As a consequence, once a conflict is triggered, safety concerns and threats to individuals' lives dramatically increase in the conflict's location. In this setting, we may expect potential connections between violence and our main outcome variable, student test scores. For instance, violence may disrupt the school routine, increase teacher and student absenteeism, and cause major psychological distress.
The estimation of the causal effects of drug-related violence on educational outcomes is not a trivial exercise due to two main empirical challenges. First, conflict-prone areas are markedly different from nonviolent ones in terms of hard-to-measure individual and community characteristics, confounding cross-section analysis that aims to identify the violence effects. We circumvent this problem by exploring variation in drug-related conflicts over time and space. Most of the disputes occur because gangs have no access to legally enforceable contracts or property rights and therefore typically rely on violence as the primary tool to resolve disputes. Indeed, our data suggest that drug gang conflicts are not rare events: on 65% of the days between 2003 and 2009, at least one favela was in conflict in Rio de Janeiro. Such highconflict frequency supports the view that the equilibrium of power among gangs is very unstable. The qualitative evidence indicates that conflicts in Rio de Janeiro are triggered by factors exogenous to local socioeconomic conditions, such as the imprisonment or release of a gang leader, betrayals, or revenge. Similar factors have been pointed out by studies on street gangs in the United States and drug gangs in Mexico. Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) suggest that social and nonpecuniary factors are likely to play an important role in explaining why gangs initiate conflicts and emphasize that the decision making of gang members cannot be reconciled with that of optimizing agents. In addition, they point out that a single member of a gang can easily initiate a dispute to show toughness; once such violence occurs, it is difficult for the opposing gang not to retaliate. Topalli, Wright, and Fornango (2002) found in interviews with active 214 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS drug dealers that vengeance and the maintenance of reputations for dangerousness are reported as motives for gang violence in St. Louis, Missouri. Guerrero-Gutierrez (2011) argues that alliances between drug trafficking organizations in Mexico have been highly unstable between 2007 and 2011 and that within drug trafficking organizations, most decisions about day-to-day operations are decentralized. Our empirical strategy allows us to estimate the causal effect of violence on education since it explores idiosyncratic temporal variation in violence rather than cross-sectional differences in neighborhood chronic violence or even in the persistent presence of drug gangs. By doing so, our strategy disentangles the effects of violence from other types of socioeconomic disadvantages that correlate with educational outcomes.
The second empirical challenge relates to data availability. Exposure to drug-related conflicts varies dramatically across time and space. Thus, any analysis of the effects of violence requires finely grained data on when and where conflicts take place. In order to track these events, we built a novel data set that aggregates thousands of anonymous reports of drug gang conflicts to a police hot line over the period between 2003 and 2009. We then read and geocoded these reports at the favela level and matched this information with educational data by exploring distances between schools and favelas. The final data set includes educational outcomes and exposure to local violence over time at both the school and student level.
We focus our analysis on young students (fifth graders) from schools located inside or on the borders of favelas. We provide evidence that students from schools that are exposed to violence perform worse on standardized math exams. Conflicts during the academic year are associated with a decrease of 0.054 standard deviations in math test scores. Our findings also suggest that the violence effect increases with conflict intensity and duration and when the conflict occurs in the months just before the exam. The effect rapidly decreases with the distance between the school and the conflict location, which supports the view that the negative spillovers on education are geographically localized. The results are not driven by student selection and are robust to placebo tests. In particular, we find no association between violence that occurs after the exam and performance at the exam. We also find that the impact of violence on school supply is an important mechanism driving our results. Gang conflicts are associated with higher teacher absenteeism, principal turnover, and temporary school shutdown. We find that teacher absences increase by 5.8 percentage points (38% of the sample mean) in years with conflicts, while schools are 12 percentage points more likely to experience principal turnover (31% of the sample mean) and are twice as likely to close temporarily in years with conflicts of longer duration.
Although there are significant short-run impacts, we find no robust evidence that the effect of violence on test scores persists over time. Taken at face value, this result suggests that transitory shocks of violence have only transitory effects on test scores, without significant lasting impacts on the overall stock of human capital. The interpretation that the effect of violence is only transitory, however, should be taken with caution. First, the literature has indicated that test score impacts of educational interventions often fade over time even when their effects on knowledge do not (Cascio & Staiger, 2012) . Second, even if test scores effects are transitory, it is possible that educational interventions have lasting effects on nonobservable personality skills, such as through the deterioration of externalizing behaviors and future academic motivation (see Heckman, Pinto, & Savelyer, 2013) . Finally, we find that violence has disruptive effects on school governance and human resources, major inputs of the education production function. In particular, there is increasing evidence that teachers have impact on abilities that are not measured by test scores but have lasting effects on adult outcomes (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2014; Jackson, 2012 ). Since we do not observe noncognitive skills and individuals' behavioral traits and we are not able to follow students over longer periods of time, future research is needed to shed light on the long-term consequences of violence on children's accumulation of human capital.
It is also important to note that our analysis estimates the effect of exposure to extreme but temporary episodes of violence and does not take into account the cross-sectional variation in violence, and the impact of being under the rule of drug dealers for extended periods. Consequently, identification comes from a residual variation in violence and our tests have little statistical power whenever the sample is broken for heterogeneity analyses. Therefore, one might reasonably interpret our estimates as a lower bound for the impact of drug-related violence on student achievement. The fact that the magnitude of this lower bound is quantitatively important supports the view that the costs of drug-related violence may go far beyond the casualties of those directly involved in the criminal activity and its victims.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no causal estimate in the literature that provides unequivocal evidence linking violence and educational outcomes. The existing literature relies on cross-sectional analyses and faces difficulties in disentangling violence from other types of socioeconomic disadvantage that also have negative impacts on children's education, such as poverty, domestic violence, and parental education (as in Grogger, 1997; Aizer, 2009; Severnini & Firpo, 2009 ). For instance, Grogger (1997) documents that violence within schools, measured with data from principals' reports, is negatively correlated with the likelihood of high school graduation and the probability of college attendance. However, violent schools are more likely to be in poorer neighborhoods, where families may suffer from other forms of disadvantage. It may be the differences in family backgrounds, not in school violence per se, that are responsible for the results.
Though less related to our work, there is also a strand of literature that evaluates whether more disruptive forms of conflicts, such as civil wars, affect education. This literature finds that school attainment decreases for cohorts exposed to conflicts at school age (Akresh & de Walque, 2008; Shemyakina, 2011; León, 2012; Chamarbagwala & Morán, 2011) . These conflicts, however, often cause economic and political chaos, disrupting institutions and infrastructure. The mechanisms that operate in our context are likely different and more specific. We use information on school supply and student mobility to shed light on the mechanisms through which violence affects education.
A growing number of studies examine negative spillovers of disputes in drug markets. Fryer et al. (2013) suggest that the expansion of crack cocaine markets in the United States led to adverse consequences such as an increase in homicide rates and low birthweight among blacks. Evans, Garthwaite, and Moore (2012) argue that the introduction of crack cocaine in the United States and the consequent spike in violence lowered life expectancy of young black men and decreased their high school graduation rates. Contrary to our results, they find that drug markets affect educational outcomes through changes in the returns to education, while our results emphasize the school supply channel. Dell (2015) analyzes the drug war in Mexico and finds suggestive evidence that drug trafficking presence is associated with lower informal sector wages and women's labor force participation. Frischtak and Mandel (2012) show that the removal of drug traffickers' rule from favelas in Rio is correlated with an increase in property values.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the institutional background, and section III presents the data on violence and primary education in Rio de Janeiro. Section IV presents a conceptual discussion and our identification strategy. In sections V and VI, we provide the results of the analysis. Section VII concludes.
II. Institutional Background

A. Drug Gangs and Violence in Rio de Janeiro
In 2009, 2,155 people were murdered in the city of Rio de Janeiro, resulting in a homicide rate of 32 per 100,000 habitants. This rate is comparable to those of the most violent cities in the United States, such as Detroit (40 murders per 100,000 habitants), Baltimore (37) and Newark (26). It is also comparable to homicide rates of major Latin American cities, such as Bogotá (24), Cartagena (28), and Monterrey (30). This record, already high by international standards, masks striking differences in exposure to violence within the city. In 2009, while rich neighborhoods in the southern zone recorded a homicide rate of approximately 6.6 per 100,000 inhabitants, poor neighborhoods in the northern zone of the city experienced 60.3 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. Violence in Rio de Janeiro increased rapidly in the early 1980s. This period is marked by the foundation of Comando Vermelho (CV), the first major organized drug gang in Rio de Janeiro (Dowdney, 2003) . During this time, drug dealers used the marijuana trade network already established in Rio de Janeiro's favelas to sell cocaine. Control over the favelas' territory became crucial to protecting the lucrative illicit trade. The favelas' geography, with tiny streets and crowded corners, as well as a lack of enforcement of formal rules within its boundaries, make them an important market for drugs, as well as a strategic place to hide from police (Silva et al., 2008) . The higher profitability of cocaine trade changed drug trade dynamics and soon led to increasing disputes among gang members. As a result, some members left Comando Vermelho and created Terceiro Comando (TC) in the late 1980s (Misse, 1999) . In the 1990s, two additional gangs, Amigos dos Amigos (ADA) and Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP), were created by dissidents of the two former gangs. This fractionalization led to more battles over the control of favelas and an increasing militarization of the drug gangs (Misse, 1997) . The arsenal used in the conflicts has often included heavy weaponry, such as grenades and modern military machine guns (e.g., M16, AK47, AR15, .30 and .50 caliber machine guns), leading to high death tolls even among those not directly involved in the drug trade.
We gathered qualitative evidence from research in sociology, media coverage, and conversations with the Intelligence Unit of the Military Police in order to better characterize drug gangs' behavior and understand the determinants of conflicts. Overall, we find evidence supporting the view that the conflicts between drug gangs are not strategically planned and instead often respond to idiosyncratic triggers, such as the imprisonment or release of a gang leader, betrayals, and revenge. According to Misse (1997) and de Souza (2001) , Rio de Janeiro's drug gangs do not have a hierarchical structure ruled by a drug baron as in the models found in Colombia or the Italian mafia. Dowdney (2003) defines the drug gangs of Rio de Janeiro as "networks of affiliated independent actors," while Baptista et al. (2000) emphasize that the gangs are controlled by a group of inexperienced and young independent leaders. Though some coordination may occur among leaders within gangs, each favela typically has a local boss who runs the operations independently and decides how to defend the territory and whether to attack his rivals.
Case studies and conversations with officers of the Intelligence Unit of the Military Police support the view that there is an unstable equilibrium among local drug traffickers. The local boss controls the favela and maintains the order until the "peace" is broken by the imprisonment or release of a gang leader, betrayal, honor-related violence, or assassinations of gang members. In the words of a favela resident quoted in Perlman (2010) , "Things are quiet here when a gang is in control. But if the leader is killed or imprisoned, all hell breaks loose-there is a war over who will control 216 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS the turf." The newspaper coverage also supports that conflicts are triggered in a quasi-random manner-for example:
Three people died and eight were wounded after Vila dos Pinheiros invasion by Baixa do Sapateiro drug dealers . . . The invasion was led by Nei da Conceição Cruz, known as Facão (machete), the main leader of Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP). The conflict began at 10 pm and lasted the whole night. The operation was supported by Matemático (mathematician). . . . Facão and Matemático left the jail last month after winning in Court the right to work outside the jail and come back to sleep. Both criminals did not return to jail after the first day under the new sentence. (Meia Hora, May 31, 2009) In section A.1 of the online appendix, we transcribe other articles that support the role of idiosyncratic factors as conflict triggers. These excerpts also indicate how violent these events are. People who live in conflict areas or near them are heavily affected. Freedom of movement is drastically restricted during these periods given the increased likelihood of being hit by a stray bullet. People who are associated with a drug gang can be evicted from their homes or murdered when a new gang assumes control. In addition, as the excerpts show, conflict duration can vary greatly. Conflicts to depose a gang can take anywhere from a few hours to multiple days. Though incumbents often succeed in the battle, cases of deposal are usually followed by attempts to reconquer the territory, extending the period of violence. This effort to regain control may occur in the same week or a few months later, depending on how much support the deposed gang can gather from other leaders. Therefore, when a conflict begins, it is hard to predict when it will end. The impact of these conflicts on the daily routine of Rio de Janeiro's habitants is also attested to by the responses from a victimization survey conducted in 2007 by DATAUFF. Fear of a stray bullet (60%) and being caught in the crossfire (44%) were mentioned as the violent events that respondents were most afraid of, followed by robberies (37%).
The police force in Rio de Janeiro has low wages, a long history of corruption, and less effective weapons than the drug gangs (Perlman, 2010) . Hence, the police do not always intervene in gang conflicts. When they intervene, however, it is usually after the first battles and, in particular, when the conflict reaches larger proportions and public attention. Until recently, the interventions attempted only to interrupt the conflict, not to definitively remove the drug dealers' control over the favelas. 3
B. The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro
Rio de Janeiro's city plan defines favelas as areas used mainly for housing, characterized by tiny and irregular streets, irregular plot size, poor urban services, and a lack of the usual legal procedures of formal licensing and construction (Law n.16/1992). There are 979 favelas in Rio de Janeiro according to Instituto Pereira Passos, which concentrate 1.093 million people, or 19% of the city population (2000 Census data), in those areas. Figure A. 1 of section A.2 of the online appendix shows the map of the city with the favelas' locations. The favelas are quite widespread across the city.
While most of the conflicts occur in favelas, not all favelas are controlled by drug gangs or are constantly under conflict. Favelas are also not a synonym for "poverty." Although favelas typically have high poverty rates, not all families living in favelas are poor, nor do all the urban poor live in favelas (Perlman, 2010) . Access to urban infrastructure, especially water and electricity distribution, has improved in the favelas in the past two decades (Vianna, 2008 ). Yet social inequalities still persist. According to Neri (2010 Neri ( ), in 2007 Neri ( -2008 and education among the favela inhabitants were significantly lower than the earnings and education of nonfavela inhabitants.
C. The Municipal Education System
The municipal administration is the main elementary school provider in Rio de Janeiro. The municipal system of Rio is one of the largest in Brazil, with 1,063 elementary schools and 550,000 students. There are no school districts in the city, and students have some choice of which school they would like to attend. The public school network is complemented by a private system, although private school enrollment is low among poor students.
About 36,000 teachers work in the municipal school system. All school employees are hired through public exams. Wages are the same across schools but vary with seniority and additional duties. Recently hired teachers are allowed to choose among open placements across different regions but do not have control over the specific school within the chosen region. Mobility across schools between years depends on seniority. After three years in the system, employees can apply to transfer to another school. Conversations with professionals suggest that some teachers do move away from violent areas between school years. Within years, however, it is not possible to transfer, and teachers can respond to episodes of violence only with absenteeism and attrition. Figure A .1 of section A.2 of the online appendix shows that schools are widely distributed across the city. This feature, along with the fact that 98% of the children of school age living in the city attend school in Rio de Janeiro, indicates that school coverage is not a main concern in the city. However, school quality is highly variable. An assessment by the Municipal Secretariat of Education in 2009 showed that 15% of students (28,000) in the fourth, fifth, and sixth grades were functionally illiterate (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, 2009).
III. Data
A. Data on Violence
Understanding the consequences of Rio de Janeiro's drug battles requires detailed information on where and when battles take place. This is necessary because exposure to violence varies between and within neighborhoods. Official crime data, provided by Instituto de Segurança Públicad (ISP), do not provide sufficiently fine-grained information on differences in violence because it records information gathered by police stations, which are not evenly distributed across space. In addition, ISP does not track information on when and where conflicts happen. Instead, it tracks only homicides, a measure that does not capture all gun conflicts. To overcome the lack of finer data available from the police, we built a novel data set based on anonymous reports to Disque-Denúncia, a crime hot line open to the public for reporting problems associated with security or public order that require government intervention.
Disque-Denúncia (DD), an NGO created in 1995, sits inside the Police Authority of the State of Rio de Janeiro. The calls received by the hot line are forwarded directly to civil and military police, who decide whether and how to respond to each report. All reports are anonymous and are neither recorded nor tracked. DD works 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and its phone number is broadly disseminated across the city (e.g., on supermarket bags and bus advertisements).
The reports are recorded in a database that contains the date, location, and description of each event. Residents may call to report any kind of crime or irregularities, the location of criminals or corpses, or simple complaints such as noise disturbances. DD provided us with all reports that mention a gunfight among drug gangs between 2003 and 2009 in the city of Rio de Janeiro. We read all reports to make sure they described a gunfight and to standardize the locations provided. The location and the description of the events allowed us to associate 92% of the reports with a specific favela. We then sorted the data by favela and by year and counted the number of days per year when at least one report of gunfight was reported to DD in that favela-year.
Section B.1 of the online appendix details how the data set was built. Table B .1 provides descriptive statistics for the reports about gunfights. There were 4,374 reports registered as "gunfights between drug gangs" from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2009. However, the analysis of the database showed that 533 reports do not describe a gunfight, so we excluded them from our analysis. In addition, we excluded 315 other reports that we were not able to associate with a specific favela, leading to a final sample of 3,526 reports.
Although 92% of the reports of drug-related violence occur in favelas, not all favelas are exposed to conflicts. Table B In our analysis, we used the number of days with conflicts in each favela rather than the total number of reports because one person may call several times on the same day to report the same conflict. The mean value of this variable in violent favelas is 1.2 per year, and the standard deviation is 3. Figure  B .1 of the online appendix shows the distribution of both the number of reports and the number of days with conflict on a panel of histograms by year for 2005, 2007, and 2009 . The dynamics of these events in the ten most violent favelas are displayed in figure B.2. This figure demonstrates that violence peaks in different years depending on the favela. Figure B .3 presents a map with the distribution of the total number of days with reports between 2003 and 2009 across favelas. We observe that conflicts are widespread across the city.
B. Educational Data
In order to determine the impact of drug-related violence on education, we use three educational databases that provide information at the level of the student, the school, and the teacher. Our main outcome variable is student scores on Prova Brasil, a national standardized exam given to all fifth graders in 2005, 2007, and 2009. 4 All students from public schools with more than thirty students enrolled in the fifth grade in 2005 or more than twenty in 2007 and 2009 were required to take this exam, which is applied on a fixed day nationally in November and graded by an external institution. The exam has two portions: math and language (Portuguese) skills. In addition, students respond to a survey about their socioeconomic profile, and teachers and principals provide information on their experience and school conditions. In 2007 and 2009, the principals answered specific questions about school problems, which we use to understand how violence affects school routine. The Prova Brasil microdata set is provided by Instituto Anisio Teixeira (INEP).
Panel A of Table B .2 provides summary statistics for fifth graders who take the Prova Brasil exam. Our benchmark sample comprises 76,084 students from 336 elementary schools that participated in at least two Prova Brasil editions between 2005 and 2009 and are located within 250 meters from a favela. We include the full sample of schools, which consists of the 736 schools of the municipal system that participated in at least two Prova Brasil editions, in the heterogeneity analysis, and in robustness checks. Fortyseven percent of the municipal schools are within 250 meters of at least one favela, and 73% are within 500 meters. Table B .2 shows school averages for the benchmark sample and separately for schools exposed to and not exposed to violence. We define the schools exposed to violence as those located within 250 meters of favelas that experienced two or more days of conflicts during the academic year This definition of exposure to violence is fully detailed in section IV. According to this definition, violence affects 45% of the schools in our sample (152 schools). The data indicate marked differences between schools exposed to and schools not exposed to violence. The former schools have significantly lower Prova Brasil scores. However, it is not clear whether the worse performance is attributable to violence, since students from households of low socioeconomic status (student's mother is illiterate or has not completed elementary education, nonwhite, and students who have previously repeated a grade or dropped out school) are overrepresented in schools exposed to violence.
We complement the Prova Brasil test scores data set with administrative data from Rio de Janeiro's Secretaria Municipal de Educação (SME) from 2003 to 2009. This data set covers all students enrolled in municipal schools and provides additional demographic information. In particular, the data set contains information on student mobility within the system. This information includes all of the municipal schools that each student has attended in the past, the grade in which each was enrolled, and if and when the student transferred between schools. These data allow us to generate indicator variables for whether the student leaves or enters a school during the school year or between academic years. Based on this data set, panel B of table B.2 shows statistics for all students from first to fifth grades in our benchmark sample of schools.
The SME also provides administrative records of teachers' absenteeism and medical leaves from 2007 throughout 2009, allowing us to calculate absenteeism rates for both unexcused absences and medical leaves. Panel C of table B.2 indicates that 16% of the teachers were absent from work at least one day during the academic year. Interestingly, this rate is lower for schools exposed to violence.
Although the SME data set is at the teacher level and allows us to link teachers to schools, it does not contain any other information on teachers' characteristics besides the number of days of absence and on medical leaves. We thus use the Educational Census (from INEP) to complement the information on teachers' mobility behavior. The Educational Census has made available microdata at the teacher-year level since 2007. These data link teachers to schools over time and include information on age, gender, race, and education. We use this information to create an indicator of whether the teacher leaves the school between academic years. Panel D of table B.2 indicates that teacher mobility between years is high (around 37%), mostly because of attrition (28%). We also use the Educational Census to obtain information on school infrastructure from 2003 and 2009. We observe that schools exposed to violence are usually those with worse infrastructure. Finally, panel E of table B.2 reports some stylized facts from a survey that principals answered in the 2007 and 2009 Prova Brasil editions. This survey investigates several aspects of the school routine, including a long list of problems that the administration faced.
C. Other Data
This work relies heavily on geocoded information, which was provided by Instituto Pereira Passos (IPP). The favela borders, which are based on satellite pictures, are key to our analysis. This information is not only precise, but also quite detailed, with much more finely grained favela definitions than other data sets. As a result, IPP's classification identifies 979 favelas (rather than about 300 given by other definitions), which allows us to better localize each event of violence. In order to match more precisely the DD reports to each favela, we use a list with the favelas' alternative names computed by IPP. The IPP also provides shape files with municipal schools' locations. We use GIS tools to calculate the distances from favelas' borders to schools. We also collect information on favelas and neighborhood sociogeographic characteristics in order to conduct robustness checks and understand the cross-section determinants of conflicts (see section C.3 of the online appendix).
IV. Empirical Model
In this paper, we analyze highly localized but extremely violent events of drug battles within the city. Once a battle is triggered, safety concerns and threats to individuals' lives dramatically increase in the conflict's location. In this setting, we expect two main potential connections between violence and our main outcome variable, student test scores. First, violence may affect the school's human resources, for example, by increasing teacher attrition and absenteeism, causing interruption of classes and school closing, or increasing workplace stress and principal turnover. Second, exposure to violence may directly affect student learning through mental health and psychological impacts. We discuss these two channels in section IVA, to provide the conceptual underpinnings from which we develop our empirical strategy (section IVB) and help identify the potential caveats (section IVC).
A. Conceptual Discussion
Violence may have substantial effects on learning through school supply. As in Grogger (1997) , the theory of compensating differentials predicts that teachers (or the school staff more generally) would demand a wage premium in order to accept work in a school at risk of violence. Indeed, Grogger (1997) finds evidence that violence at school is positively correlated with teachers' salaries in a nationwide sample of schools in the United States in the early 1980s. In our setting, as salaries are fixed, violence may lead to higher teacher attrition and absenteeism. As a result, it is straightforward to predict that student achievement will suffer as classes are taught sporadically or discontinued. We also hypothesize that violence may have disruptive effects on school routine and management. As supported by several reports in the media, extreme events of gang conflicts can affect the school routine by causing temporary school closings and interruption DRUG BATTLES AND SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT 219 of classes. Principal turnover may also rise since managing a school in an area with high conflict is likely to be difficult as well as risky.
The consequences of exposure to violence may extend beyond the school supply channel. Research conducted by psychologists and psychiatrists has recognized the potential harmful effects of neighborhood violence on children's mental health. Fowler et al.'s (2009) meta-analysis even suggests that children exposed to community violence are at a greater risk for developing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms. In addition to PTSD, exposure to violence can also be associated with depression and anxiety in young children (Fitzpatrick, 1993) . Research contrasting subtypes of violence suggests that the effect of exposure to violence on negative outcomes may increase with the children's physical proximity to the violent events (Nader et al., 1990; Fitzpatrick, 1993) .
It is important to note that if families make decisions after observed changes to school inputs, parents might increase investments in their children's human capital in order to compensate for the unexpected cost of violence. First, parents' investment may moderate mental health consequences. Second, parents may change their input decision rule in education, for instance, spending more time teaching their children at home or even transferring them to a more distant public or private school. In this case, student attrition and absenteeism are also potential outcomes of exposure to violence.
Although a number of paths connect local violence and children's learning, there is no causal estimate available in the literature that unequivocally attributes a negative effect on student achievement to violence. The results in the research conducted by psychologists and psychiatrists have limitations, as identified by psychiatrist Osofsky (1999) (cited in Aizer, 2009) . One important shortcoming relates to the fact that neighborhood violence is generally correlated with other types of socioeconomic disadvantage (poverty, parental education, domestic violence), which has been shown to have negative impacts on children's education. Thus, since the literature has not been able to disentangle violence from other detrimental confounding factors, the existing estimates possibly overstate the impact of violence on test scores (Aizer, 2009) . Another limitation arises from difficulty defining or characterizing neighborhood violence, which leads to measurement error. Both of these shortcomings-omitted variables and measurement error-are also concerns in previous studies in economics, as recognized by their authors (see, e.g., Grogger, 1997; Severnini & Firpo, 2009; and Aizer, 2009 ).
B. Empirical Strategy
This section describes how we explore our data to avoid identification problems found in previous research and achieve a causal estimate of the effect of exposure to violence on learning. The modeling of the production function for cognitive achievement is often based on the idea that child development is a cumulative process, dependent on the history of family and school inputs as well as on innate characteristics (Todd & Wolpin, 2003) . In this paper, we do not attempt to estimate a tightly specified education production function given that we do not observe past inputs and test scores. Instead, we propose a reduced-form strategy that relies on the evidence that variation in conflicts within favelas over time is orthogonal to any other past and contemporaneous latent determinants of learning. We estimate the following equation, (2) where ϑ jt is the number of days with a recorded report of gang conflict in favela j throughout the academic year t. In our benchmark specification, this period includes the months from March through November (the month in which the Prova Brasil exam is taken). The term 1{D sj < B} is a function that indicates whether the linear distance D sj between the school s and the favela j's border is less than B meters. Our benchmark specification sets the buffer B = 250, at which value the variable V st captures only the conflicts that take place near the school-in favelas located up to 250 meters from the school. The benchmark specification also sets n = 2. In this case, the variable V st captures whether the school experienced two or more days of violence within B = 250 meters of distance during the school period. By defining n = 2, we exclude isolated shootings that may add noise to our analysis. Equation (2) is a straightforward and flexible way of measuring violence. We can easily compute this variable at different values for the parameters B and n, which enables us to better characterize the violence effect (by distance B and intensity n) and perform robustness checks. The terms γ t and μ s in equation (1) are year and school fixed effects, respectively. Year fixed effects capture common time trends, such as macroeconomic and labor market conditions at the municipal level political cycles, and common educational policies. School dummies control not only for unobserved heterogeneity at the school level but also for fixed neighborhood characteristics around the school. For most students, this also controls for neighborhood characteristics around their households, since 57% of students live within a 15 minute walk to their school. The within-schools estimator eliminates the cross-sectional variation in violence 220 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS levels and captures idiosyncratic shocks driven by conflicts. Thus, we remove the effects of the presence of a drug gang in the locality (and therefore remove the cross-sectional variation in socioeconomic disadvantages correlated with chronic violence) and keep only the effect of the violence resulting from a fight between drug gangs. 5 Given that our analysis does not take into account the cross-sectional variation in violence and the impact of being under the rule of drug dealers for extended periods, one might reasonably interpret our estimates as a lower bound for the impact of drug-related violence on student achievement.
The term Z ist includes student socioeconomic characteristics in order to absorb within-school heterogeneity and limit potential selection bias in the pool of students taking the Prova Brasil exam. Here we include students' gender, race, mother's education, age fixed effects, and dummy variables for whether the child has ever repeated a grade or dropped out in previous years. The term X st indicates a set of variables that absorb confounding effects driven by within-school heterogeneity in classroom size and composition (which includes the number of students and the averages for the students' socioeconomic characteristics mentioned above), as well as by differential school physical infrastructure (we add dummy variables for whether the school has a computer lab, science lab, principal's office, teachers' offices, free lunch, and a kitchen).
We focus on young children (fifth graders) in order to avoid potential endogeneity driven by reverse causality: lower school quality may lead children to become involved in drug trafficking and higher violence. Our benchmark sample includes only the students enrolled in schools located within 250 meters from at least one favela, which retains 336 schools, or 45% of the total number of municipal schools that participated in at least two Prova Brasil editions. This restriction generates more comparable treatment and control groups because it accounts for the fact that schools near favelas are possibly exposed to higher levels of chronic violence and typically have more students from disadvantaged households. We nevertheless confirm that our results are robust to sample selection.
Identification relies on the assumption that conditional on school and time fixed effects, as well as on students and school observed characteristics, unexpected and severe conflicts between drug gangs within favelas are uncorrelated with any latent determinant of children's education. If this assumption holds, we are able to identify the causal impact 5 Though incumbents often succeed in the battle, the eruption of a conflict will eventually result in the entry of a new gang into the territory if the incumbent gang is deposed. In this case, the flux of gang entry into and exit out of the territory may have effects on student performance through other types of violence besides those specifically generated by the conflict. For instance, the new gang may impose widespread psychological fear and life threat among favela residents and teachers through extortions and evictions. In case of gang deposal, school fixed effects will not be sufficient to eliminate the effect of the time-varying presence of gangs. Because we cannot observe gang names, we are not able to control for time-varying gang presence and identify the relevance of its effects. of violence on student achievement given that our variable of interest V st should be orthogonal to the error term ε ist in equation (1). In all specifications, we report robust standard errors clustered by school, the level at which we measure violence. Given that dependent variables and regressors tend to be spatially correlated in our context, we also report Conley standard errors in order to account for both spatial correlation (across schools) and serial correlation (within schools, across time). 6 The coefficient of interest β captures a reduced-form effect, which includes the impacts transmitted through all the main potential channels likely to be at work in our setting.
C. Validating the Empirical Strategy
A first potential problem to be considered in our analysis concerns student selection at the Prova Brasil exam. In our setting, students are not constrained to study at schools near their homes. Parents' choices may therefore lead to students' attrition. In particular, if high-performing students move from a school exposed to violence to another located in a nonexposed area, the estimated effect of violence on achievement at the end of the year may capture the worsening of the pool of students rather than the causal impact of violence on learning. In section VG, we perform tests for selection. The results indicate that our estimates are not biased by self-selection of students into or out of a particular school.
A second potential concern relates to measurement error. We measure violence from anonymous reports, and propensity to report may vary within regions and over time. Given that we explore within-school variation, our estimates are at risk if the propensity to report in some neighborhoods changes due to factors also correlated with student outcomes. In order to test for bias in violence measurement, we crosscheck the DD data with official homicide data. In section C.2 of the online appendix, we show that trends in both series are remarkably similar (figure C.1). In addition, we aggregate the reports into eighteen major regions of the city for which homicide data are available. We plot the relationship between the homicide rate and the number of days with reports by region separately for each year. We observe a strong correlation between homicide rates and number of reports within years (ranging from about 0.50 to 0.75) and that the regional propensity to over-or underreport is constant over time (figure C.2). (For interested readers, section C.3 of the online appendix presents a further characterization of conflict dynamics based on DD data by examining their sociodemographic determinants and their time series properties). All regressions include year fixed effects. Student characteristics include sex, race, age fixed effects, dummies for levels of mother's education, and dummies indicating if students have ever repeated a grade or dropped out. Classroom composition includes share of boys, share of nonwhites, average age, share of students who have previously repeated a grade, and share of students who dropped out in the past. School controls are dummies indicating whether there is a computer lab, science lab, free lunch, teachers' offices, principal's office, and kitchen. The variable of interest (violence) is a dummy indicating at least two days of conflict within the school year in a favela within 250 meters of the school. We report robust standard errors clustered at the school level (in parentheses) and Conley standard errors (in brackets, computed at the 500 m cutoff). Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. test scores and the impact of violence on language achievement. Column 1 presents our simplest specification, which includes only year fixed effects. In column 2, we add controls for student, classroom, and school characteristics in order to absorb confounding effects driven by observed heterogeneity in students' background, school infrastructure, classroom size, and composition. Column 3 reports our full specification. It adds school fixed effects and presents our within-school estimates. For each of these regressions, the sample includes students from schools located within 250 meters of at least one favela. The variable of interest, violence, captures whether the school experienced two or more days of violence during the school period within a radius of 250 meters of the school.
V. Results
A. Impact on Student Achievement
In panel A, column 1 shows a significant negative correlation between violence and math achievement, though this result is conditioned only on year fixed effects. When we move from column 1 to column 2, where we include crosssection controls, the point estimate declines only slightly. This result indicates that the heterogeneity in students, classroom, and school characteristics plays a limited role in generating the observed correlation between violence and math achievement. Column 3 reports our within-school estimates. Within-group estimators used to control for fixed effects may isolate omitted variable bias, but they also typically remove much of the useful information in the variable of interest. In our case, deviations from means eliminate cross-sectional variation in violence levels. As we move from column 2 to column 3, the correlation indeed drops in magnitude but nevertheless remains statistically significant at the 5% level. Clustering standard errors one level up, allowing for unrestricted residual correlation within neighborhoods, provides similar results (standard errors drop marginally from 0.027 to 0.025). As we discuss in section IV, this effect can be regarded as causal since, conditional on time and school fixed effects, the remaining variation in the variable of interest is plausibly idiosyncratic.
Panel B repeats the same sequence of specifications for language test scores. The coefficient drops relatively more as we move from column 1 to 3, where it remains negative but is no longer statistically significant. This result indicates that both observed and unobserved heterogeneity tend to fully absorb the relationship between violence and language achievement shown in column 1.
Column 3 of table 1 is our preferred specification and is the one we use in the remainder of the paper. The magnitude of the coefficient on the violence indicator we find in this column is quantitatively important. Exposure to violence triggered by drug gangs leads to a reduction of 0.054 standard deviations in math test scores. This effect is equivalent to one-third of the magnitude of the coefficient estimated in a regression of math test scores on a dummy indicating that the child's mother had low education (none or only primary education). In comparison to the importance of other determinants of academic performance, the effect of violence is equivalent to one-fourth to one-half of the drop in test scores associated with a 1 standard deviation decrease in teacher quality, as documented in the related literature (Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004) .
In the following sections we further characterize the violence effect on achievement and present robustness tests. Given the results in panel B, the remainder of the paper focuses on achievement in math. Throughout the following sections, we provide evidence that regardless of how we measure violence or restrict the sample, we detect a negative and statistically significant impact of violence on student achievement. We also rule out selection bias in different ways.
B. Distance between Schools and Conflict Location
In this section, we examine how the relationship between violence and student achievement varies with the distance between schools and conflict location. In each column of table D.1 of the online appendix, we follow our benchmark specification but report regressions where we increase the buffer size in which we compute the violence indicator. In column 1, we set the buffer of distance in which we compute the violence to 0, and focus only on schools located in favelas. Despite the small sample, we find a robust and higher coefficient (0.130) than in our benchmark sample. Note that this is the most straightforward exercise since favelas' borders provide a natural limit to determine which schools are potentially affected by a conflict that takes place in the favela. Moreover, schools inside favelas tend to be far away from the border and the influence of other favelas.
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The conflicts, however, may also affect the surrounding areas of a favela. A crucial question is how close a school must be from a favela to be affected by its conflicts. Column 2 reports our benchmark coefficient. In this specification, we restrict the sample to schools located up to 250 meters from a favela and compute the violence indicator within a buffer of 250 meters from the school. In columns 3 and 4, we repeat the same exercise for the 500 and 750 meter samples, respectively (i.e., we increase both the sample of schools and the buffer of distance in which we compute violence). We find smaller and nonsignificant estimates in both columns. Overall, table D.1 suggests that the relevant distance is short and that the response to violence is localized. Figure 1A complements table D.1 by plotting the coefficients of several different regressions of student achievement on the violence indicator, each computed within a slightly larger buffer of more than 250 meters. We observe that the effect decreases as we gradually move away from a short, and supposedly relevant, distance from the violence epicenter.
This qualitative result is particularly robust in light of the fact that our analysis by distance faces some caveats. First, the definition of the sample of schools and the computation of the violence indicator can be made independent of each other. In this case, we can set a sufficiently large sample of schools (e.g., the schools in our benchmark sample that are within 250 meters from at least one favela) and vary the buffer in which we compute the violence indicator. Irrespective of how we restrict the sample of schools, however, violence indicators computed within small buffers assign to 0 the violence that occurs outside the buffers but still within a short distance from the school. An increase in the buffer in which we compute violence otherwise increases the chance of considering all the relevant violence that occurred nearby. Thus, estimates of violence effects at small buffers may be attenuated. We provide evidence on this and further discuss additional caveats regarding our analysis by distance in section D.1 of the online appendix.
C. Intensity
Our benchmark measure of violence is a dummy variable that indicates whether the school experienced two or more days of conflict during a certain span of time (the academic period) and within a certain distance from the school (the buffer of 250 meters is the benchmark). In this section, we further characterize the relationship between violence and achievement by varying the number of days with conflict during the academic year within the benchmark buffer of 250 meters. In other words, we test whether violence impacts vary with conflict intensity by assuming that violence intensity increases with the number of days of conflict.
To accomplish this, we perform two tests. First, we compute a series of violence indicators by varying n in equation (2), the number of days of conflict during the school period, that occur within a radius of B = 250 meters from the school. The first column of table D.2 of the online appendix presents the effect of violence on math achievement, where the violence indicator is defined for n ≥ 1. The second column presents our benchmark result, where n ≥ 2. Columns 3 and 4 show the results for n ≥ 7 and n ≥ 9, respectively. As these four regressions show, the effect of violence on student achievement increases with violence intensity. In column 1 we observe that the effect on achievement of one or more days of conflict is not statistically different from 0. As mentioned in section IVB, this dummy may capture isolated and nonrelevant shootings that add noise to our analysis, resulting in measurement error and attenuation bias. Another interpretation is that in this case, intensity is not sufficiently high to make violence effects sizable. The second column presents our benchmark estimate. Columns 3 and 4 show that the impact doubles when we consider seven and nine or more days of conflict, respectively. In column 5, we run math achievement on a continuous measure of violence, defined as the number of days with conflict. We find a negative coefficient of −0.010. Figure 1B complements table D.2 by plotting the coefficients of nine different regressions of student achievement on the violence indicator, each computed for a distinct n ∈ (1, 9). We see a clear negative relationship between the effect of violence and violence intensity, captured by n. 7 We also perform a second test, in which the violence indicator is calculated in two alternative ways. In column 6 of table D.2, the variable of interest indicates whether the school experienced two or more days of conflict within fourteen contiguous days during the school period. In column 7, conversely, the variable of interest indicates whether the school was exposed to two or more days of conflict within the school period but more than fourteen days apart. We assume that two or more days of conflict within a lengthy but not large span of time indicates that the conflict has continued over time and, for this reason, can be regarded as a more disruptive event. Though the coefficients are not significantly different, the comparison of the results in columns 6 and 7 is supportive of the view that the effect of long-lasting conflicts is higher than the impact of episodes of violence sporadically distributed over the school period. 8
D. Timing
Another important aspect of the effect of violence on student achievement is the specific timing of the impacts. The question of timing has at least two relevant dimensions: (a) the extent to which student achievement by the end of the year varies with the moment of the violence shock during the 7 These estimates might be attenuated by the fact that we have assigned into the control group schools exposed to violence up to n. If we alternatively omit these schools from the regressions, the point estimates become only slightly larger in magnitude. 8 Results are similar whenever we consider windows of 7 or 21 contiguous days of conflict. school year and (b) the extent to which violence has either persistent or transitory effects on learning.
In order to explore the timing of the effect of violence, we first break the computation of the violence variable into trimesters. We then run twenty different regressions of math test scores on the indicator of violence, each computed within a different trimester (from the first trimester of year -3 before exams until the fourth trimester of year +1 after exams). All regressions follow our benchmark specification and sample of schools. Figure 1C presents the results. We first observe that the point estimates vary around 0 over the trimesters before the current academic year. We also observe that the impact grows gradually from the two to four trimesters before the exam to a peak for violence in the trimester just before the exam, declining precipitously thereafter. Finally, it is important to note that both the variation of the point estimate and the confidence intervals around the estimated coefficients for year -3 tend to increase. This results from the fact that our sample of schools drops by around 30% due to the lack of data on violence before 2003. (In section D.3 of the online appendix, we further characterize the timing of the effects of violence both within and between calendar years.)
Overall, we find no significant relationship between learning and past violence. This result is consistent with other studies that also find that treatment effects on test scores fade away rapidly (see Kane & Staiger, 2008; Jacob, Lefgren, & Sims, 2010; Rothstein, 2010; Banerjee et al., 2007; Andrabi et al., 2011; Herrmann and Rockoff, 2010) . The interpretation that the effect of violence is only transitory, however, should be taken with caution. First, test score impacts of educational interventions often fade over time even when their effects on knowledge does not (Cascio & Staiger, 2012) . Second, even if there is no permanent effect on learning, it is possible that there are lasting effects on social skills such as through the deterioration of externalizing behaviors and future academic motivation (see Heckman et al., 2013) . Table D .4 of the online appendix examines heterogeneity in the effect of violence by students' socioeconomic characteristics. Each column shows the result from our benchmark specification, added by an interaction term between the violence indicator and a different student characteristic (indicators of gender, race, level of mother's education, age, repeated before, dropped out before). Column 1 replicates our benchmark specification, without interaction terms. In column 2, we add an interaction term between the violence indicator and a dummy for boys. In the rest of the columns, we add interaction terms, respectively, for variables that indicate nonwhites, low-educated mother (student's mother is illiterate or has not completed elementary school), student's age greater than 11, and students who have repeated a grade or have dropped out in the past. Overall, we find that differential effects are in general statistically insignificant.
E. Heterogeneity
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The point estimates, however, are jointly informative and provide suggestive evidence that violence tends to be more detrimental to high-performing students (those with highly educated mothers, whites, in the correct age for grade, and who never repeated a grade or dropped out). In fact, if highperforming students in particular benefit from instruction at school, the results in table D.4 support the view that school supply likely works as a relevant link between violence and learning. Section VI provides more direct evidence in support of this view. Although the point estimates are consistent with the interpretations already given, the evidence should be taken with caution given that the estimated differences are in general statistically insignificant.
F. Math versus Language
In order to complement the results of table 1, we replicate for language test scores all tables and figures of sections VB through VE. The results are available in section D.5 of the online appendix. We find that coefficients for language are systematically nonsignificant and smaller in magnitude when compared to the coefficients for math, except for the localized effect of violence for schools located inside favelas when we consider Conley standard errors (see column 1 of the analogous table D.1 for language). Even so, the magnitude of the coefficient is nearly half that estimated for math (-0.071 versus -0.130) .
Overall, the results are consistent with previous work on the efficacy of other educational interventions. Fryer (2014) finds that the adoption of a series of best practices by lowperforming traditional public schools (such as increased time and better human capital) can significantly increase student achievement in math but has little or no effect on language. Other evidence from the literature on the impacts of charter schools on learning indicates qualitatively similar results (Angrist et al., 2010; Gleason et al., 2010) . (In section D.6, we discuss theories that help explain the differences in treatment effects by subject.)
G. Student Mobility and Selection
In our setting, students are not constrained to study at schools near their homes. Parents may therefore respond to violence by moving their children to another school. On the one hand, understanding parents' response to violence is relevant on its own. On the other hand, a major concern regarding our empirical strategy is student selection. The observed correlation between violence and student achievement may be spurious if violence is also associated with student mobility. In particular, if high-performing students move from a school exposed to violence to one located in a less violent area, the estimated effect of violence on achievement at the end of the year may be capturing the worsening of the pool of students rather than a causal impact of violence on achievement.
In order to examine whether violence affects student mobility, we explore the SME administrative records on students' enrollment, which allow us to follow students' enrollment number over time and across schools. Section D.7 of the online appendix details the analysis and discusses the results. We find that violence is in general positively associated with transfers within the academic year, although the point estimates indicate that the magnitude of the effect is small in absolute terms. We observe no significant effects on transfers at the end of the academic year on dropout.
Overall, the results indicate that violence has only limited effects on transfers within the academic year. In particular, we find no relevant evidence on differential departures from schools exposed to violence by students who come from more educated mothers that could result in the worsening of the pool of students taking the Prova Brasil exam. Still, in order to provide further evidence on student selection, we complement our analysis by testing for student selection at the Prova Brasil exam. We regress the socioeconomic characteristics of the students who take the exam on the violence during the school year. The first column of table D.10 follows our benchmark specification, in which we regress on violence the number of students who take the exam. We observe no significant association between violence and the number of students taking the exam. In column 2, we regress on violence a dummy variable indicating gender equal to male. We see that the violence during the school year is not significantly associated with a higher probability of observing a male in the pool of students taking the exam by the end of the year. In the following columns, we repeat the same specification but for other binary dependent variables: race (nonwhite), age (12 or older), mother's education (student's mother is illiterate or has not completed elementary school), ever repeated, and ever dropped out in previous years. In none of these regressions do we find a systematic association between violence and student selection.
VI. The Impact on School Supply
Throughout the previous sections, we followed a reducedform strategy in order to identify and characterize an average effect of violence on test scores. This effect can be driven by a variety of channels likely to be at work in our setting. Since we are able to observe teacher and principal behavior, the final section of this paper focuses on the identification of specific mechanisms linking violence and school supply.
A. Teacher Absenteeism and Turnover
There are many mechanisms through which teacher absenteeism and attrition may reduce student achievement (see Miller, Murnane, & Willett, 2008) . It may reduce instructional intensity and create discontinuities of instruction and disruption of regular classroom routines and procedures. It may also undermine common planning time, which can inhibit attempts by schools to implement practices across Dependent variables are the total number of teachers' absences (columns 1 and 2) and medical leaves (columns 3 and 4) normalized by the number of teachers on duty in the school. Columns 1 and 3 indicate the percentage of teachers who miss classes, and columns 2 and 4 indicate the average length of absence. All regressions include school and year fixed effects, school characteristics (see notes to table 1 for the list), number of teachers in the school, and teachers' average profile (age, gender, and dummies for graduate and undergraduate degrees). The period of analysis is 2007 to 2009. We report robust standard errors (in parentheses) and Conley standard errors (in brackets, computed at the 500 m cutoff). Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
classrooms and grades. Consistent with this view, many studies have found a negative relationship between teacher absenteeism, turnover, and student achievement (Miller et al., 2008; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2009; Ronfeldt, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2013) . Table 2 examines teachers' behavior in terms of absenteeism and medical leaves. We use three years of data (2007) (2008) (2009) to evaluate the effects of violence on both the extensive (percentage of teachers) and the intensive margins (average number of days of absence). Column 1 indicates that in years with episodes of violence, teacher absences increase by 5.8 percentage points (38% of the sample mean). Panel B indicates that the effect is qualitatively similar for both contiguous and noncontiguous violence indicators, though only in the former is the coefficient statistically different from 0. Column 2 suggests that the contiguous violence is associated with an increase in absenteeism on the intensive margin (significant at 10%). There is no evidence that violence affects medical leaves.
In order to examine teachers' behavior in more detail, we analyze teachers' turnover by using microdata from the Educational Census at the teacher-year level. More specifically, we use three years of data (2007) (2008) (2009) to create a dummy that indicates whether the teacher left the school between academic years. We then use our benchmark specification to regress teacher mobility between years on violence, at the teacher level, and also to explore heterogeneity across teachers' characteristics. Table E .1 of the online appendix shows the results. In all columns, the dependent variable is an indicator of whether the teacher left the school between years to teach in another school or to leave teaching. We first observe a positive but nonsignificant coefficient in column 1. In columns 2 through 7, we test interactions between violence and teachers' characteristics. We find that of the analyzed characteristics, only the indicator of education at the graduate level (master's or doctoral degree) is associated with violence. In columns 6 and 7, we observe a positive, significant, and large coefficient of the interaction between violence and graduate diploma. The point estimate of 0.09 percentage points in column 7 represents 24% of the sample mean.
The results from table E.1 provide evidence that more educated teachers are leaving the school when exposed to violence. As mentioned in section IVA, because salaries are fixed in our setting, violence is expected to lead to higher teacher attrition and absenteeism. This should be particularly true for those with higher education, who may have higher productivity and better outside options. Overall, the findings in this section are consistent with the evidence that nonpecuniary factors and work environment characteristics are significant determinants of teacher transfers and retention (Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Boyd et al., 2005; Jackson, 2009) .
B. Impact on School Routine
In table 3 we examine whether violence affects school routine. In this analysis, we rely on a survey answered by principals in the 2007 and 2009 Prova Brasil editions. This survey investigates multiple aspects of the school's routine, including an extensive list of problems faced by the administration. We regress an indicator variable for whether the principal mentioned a given problem on the indicator for violence. The regressions include the full set of student and school controls, as well as school and year fixed effects.
Panel A of table 3 indicates that in schools exposed to violence, principals were 7.7 percentage points more likely to report a threat to teachers' lives, an effect equivalent to 40% of the sample mean. There is also evidence that violence affects teacher turnover, which increases by 12.7 percentage 226 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Dependent variables indicate whether the school principal mentioned that the problem occurred during the academic year. All regressions include school and year fixed effects, school characteristics (see the notes to table 1), number of students, student average characteristics (share of boys, share of whites, share with high-educated mothers, average age, share of students who have dropped out in the past, and share of students who failed a grade in the past), and principals' characteristics (age, gender, and dummies for graduate and undergraduate degrees). The sample is for 2007 and 2009. Robust standard errors in parentheses, Conley standard errors in brackets (computed at the 500 m cutoff). Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. points in violent years according to principals' reports. Panel B examines differential impacts depending on whether violence is experienced in contiguous or noncontiguous days. Column 1 shows that principals are 24 percentage points more likely to report an interruption of classes (temporary school closing) in years with contiguous days of violence. Also of interest, column 5 indicates that the administrative staff are more likely to turn over in years with contiguous violence. The schools that are exposed to this type of event are 12 percentage points more likely to have a principal who spends less than two years on the job (a 31% increase in the sample mean). This finding is straightforward given the tremendous stress that principals face in managing schools during a period of conflict.
Finally, we find no significant association between violence and student absenteeism, as also reported by principals. This suggests that student absenteeism does not increase noticeably in years when conflicts take place. Note that both results on absenteeism suggest that teachers are absent more than students during years with conflicts, though bear in mind that we measure teacher and student absenteeism with different data. We believe that differences between the location of their homes imply that teachers and students face exposure to violence by attending school in different ways. Most teachers do not live near to schools and have not adapted to a violent environment, so they should avoid going to school during days of conflict and remain safe at home. The same is not true for students because the majority of them live near the school, so they are already in a conflict area even if they do not attend classes.
Overall, the evidence from this section indicates that violence negatively affects school supply by increasing teachers' absenteeism, school closings, and principals' turnover. Teachers and principals respond to violence especially when conflicts last for several days.
VII. Conclusion
This study provides evidence that drug-related conflicts have negative spillovers on the population living and working in conflict areas by demonstrating that violence affects both student achievement and education supply. Such episodes of violence have become a pervasive problem in many parts of the world. However, there is only limited understanding on the causal effects of violence due to identification challenges. As acknowledged in previous research, violence typically correlates with poverty and other local economic conditions. Simple cross-section analysis is therefore subject to measurement error and omitted variable bias. We circumvent this endogeneity by exploring variation over time in gunfights between drug gangs that are plausibly exogenous to local socioeconomic conditions. We find that students' scores are 0.054 standard deviations lower in math in years in which they are exposed to drug battles. Coefficients for language tests, however, are systematically nonsignificant and smaller in magnitude when compared to the coefficients for math. We also find that the effect of violence on math achievement increases with conflict intensity and duration and when the conflict occurs in the months just before the exam. The effect rapidly decreases with the distance between the school and the location where the conflict takes place. Thus, though substantially disruptive, the negative spillovers of episodes of violence on education seem geographically localized.
We also find that the effect of violence is transitory, although this result should be taken with caution. Test score impacts of educational interventions may fade over time even when their effects on knowledge do not. Moreover, violence may affect student attainment through its effects on learning. In this case, violence may affect completed years of schooling in the long run. Finally, even if there is no permanent effect on learning, it is possible that there are lasting effects on social skills such as through behavior problems and academic motivation.
We are able to provide evidence for one mechanism through which violence affects student achievement: violence decreases instructional time and affects school human resources by increasing temporary school closing, principal turnover, and teacher attrition and absenteeism. Interestingly, we find that students rarely respond to these conflicts by leaving schools exposed to violence. Difficulty in predicting violence and evaluating alternatives may explain this finding.
It is worth emphasizing that our analysis estimates the effect of exposure to extreme but temporary episodes of violence and does not take into account the cross-sectional variation in violence and the impact of being under the rule of drug dealers for extended periods. Consequently, one might reasonably interpret our estimates as a lower bound for the impact of drug-related violence on student achievement. The fact that the magnitude of this lower bound is quantitatively important supports the view that the costs of drug-related violence may go far beyond the casualties of those directly involved in the criminal activity and its victims. In this case, violence spillovers should be regarded as a relevant policy concern in conflict areas. In particular, our results indicate that episodes of violence have detrimental effects on the provision of public goods. We observe in our context that violence specifically disrupts school routine and human resources, two of the most important inputs of the education production function. Because salaries are fixed, violence leads to higher teacher attrition and absenteeism. These findings are consistent with the evidence that nonpecuniary factors and work environment characteristics are significant determinants of teacher behavior. Our results therefore suggest that the design and implementation of educational policies, in particular those related to human resources management, should take into consideration nonpecuniary factors associated with exposure to violence. On the one hand, both the school environment and its surroundings would trivially benefit from localized policing. On the other hand, higher salaries could help retain high-quality teachers in schools located in violent neighborhoods in order to compensate for nonpecuniary disadvantages.
